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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GLEN W. ROLLINS, RUTH ELLEN 
ROLLINS, NANCY LOUISE ROLLINS, 
and O. WAYNE ROLLINS 
II, as trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins 
Marital Trust, 
Plaintiffs. 
v. 
LOR, INC., GARY W. ROLLINS and 
R. RANDALL ROLLINS, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil Action No.: 2014CV249480 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMiVIARY JUDG~IENT 
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims. 
Having considered the Motion and the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court 
I. Facts 
A. LOR Formation, Ownership, and Management 
In 1978, O. Wayne Rollins founded Defendant LOR, Inc. ("LOR") as a vehicle. to 
manage the Rollins family wealth. I In 1986, the elder Wayne2 elected for LOR to be taxed as a 
closely held corporation pursuant to Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code so the 
corporation would not be subject to federal income tax at the corporate level and the taxes would 
I Until 2003, LOR provided a variety of administrative, financial, and other services for members of the Rollins 
family. Since 2003, these functions are handled by REA Management Company, LLC ("REA"). RFA's manager is 
LOR and its members include the Gary and Randall's voting trusts and nine other Rollins family trusts. 
2 As this is a family matter, first names will be used throughout this Order for the sake of brevity and clarity. 
1 
instead pass through to shareholders. At the time of this S-corporation election, he also created 
nine Qualified S-trusts to hold stock in LOR for each of his grandchildren. The assets of each S- 
Trust are to be distributed to the beneficiary when he or she turns 45 years old. The elder Wayne 
owned the majority of the voting stock (Class B stock) and his sons, Defendants Gary and 
Randall Rollins, owned minority voting stock (Class C stock). Class A non-voting stock was 
owned by the elder Wayne (17.4%), Gary and Randall (18.3% each), and the S-Trusts 
collectively. The elder Wayne died in 1991 and his Class B stock converted to non-voting stock 
and passed to Gary and Randall. 
In 1993, Gary and Randall, in consultation with advisors at Arthur Anderson and King & 
Spalding and LOR senior employee Glenn Grove, initiated the Rollins Family Capital 
Preservation Plan (the "Plan"), a series of estate planning transactions designed to pass their 
LOR shares to their children and grandchildren without subjecting them to estate, gift, or transfer 
taxes and yet maintain control of LOR. Gary and Randall each transferred a lifetime income 
interest in their LOR Class A non-voting shares (56,507 shares each) to The 1993 Gary W. 
Rollins Marital Trust (the "Marital Trust") and The 1993 Randall Rollins Marital Trust (the 
"Randall Marital Trust"). Plaintiffs, the children of Gary and Ruthie Rollins, are the trustees of 
the Marital Trust. Upon the death of Ruthie, the remainder income interest was to pass to the 
Rollins Children'S Trusts (including trusts in each of the Plaintiffs' names) in exchange for an 
established sum and ultimately the Grandchildren's Trust would have an option to buy half the 
interest from the Children's Trusts in 2024. 
The Marital Trust was established as a grantor trust. See 26 U.S.C. 361(c)(2)(A)(i). Gary 
was the grantor and is liable for taxes on grantor trust's income. Neither the Marital Trust nor 
Ruthie as beneficiary had any tax liability. Under the Marital Trust Agreement, Gary retained 
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the right as grantor to swap the property held in trust for property of equivalent value and all 
income was to be distributed to Ruthie. 
The Plan was introduced to Plaintiffs by Gary and Grove at a family meeting in 
December, 1993, but the planned transactions were not discussed in detail. Plaintiffs aver they 
were told at that meeting Gary would be trustee of the Marital Trust until his death at which time 
Plaintiffs would be trustees, a fact Defendants dispute. Gary and Plaintiffs signed paperwork 
implementing the Plan on December 20, 1993, and again on January 7, 1994, executing the 
Marital Trust agreement and a first and second Agreement Concerning Simultaneous Gift and 
Remainder Sale in their capacity as trustees and Promissory Notes for certain sums as 
consideration for the remainder interest flowing to the Children's Trusts in their capacity as 
grantors and trustees. Plaintiffs aver they were only given signature pages and were not given 
copies of the 1993 Transaction Documents to review or keep. On February 19, 1994 Plaintiffs 
signed a Master Custody Agreement establishing a custodial account for the Marital Trust at 
Northern Trust." LOR and then RF A acted as administrator of the Marital Trust on behalf of the 
trustees until early 2011. Grove was primarily responsible for the administration of the Marital 
Trust but testified he never consulted Plaintiffs regarding decisions made on behalf of the Marital 
Trust. 
On Apri115, 1996, LOR's articles of incorporation were amended to clarify that the Class 
C stock held its voting rights even if maintained in a voting trust. 4 All the shareholders signed 
the unanimous consent approving the amendment, including all four Plaintiffs in their capacities 
) On October 29, 2008, Glen signed an updated Master Custody Agreement allowing RF A to manage the Northern 
Trust custodial account. 
4 Gary and Randall had transferred their LOR Class C shares to revocable voting trusts in 1994. In this same year, 
Grace bought the LOR Class B shares out of a QTIP account that held the shares since the death of the elder Wayne 
and sold it ro Peggy and Ruthie, the wives of Randall and Gary, respectively, who in tum sold the Class B shares to 
their husbands. 
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as trustees of the Marital Trust. On November 8, 1999, the LOR shareholders signed an 
agreement that no shares would be transferred outside the Rollins family. Three of the four 
Plaintiffs signed the shareholder agreement in their capacities as trustees of the Marital Trust- 
Wayne II did not sign. Glen, Ellen, and Nancy were only provided the signature pages and have 
testified they did not understand themselves to be trustees of the Marital Trust when they signed. 
Each year, either Glen or Ellen would sign tax returns filed on behalf of the Marital Trust. 
Plaintiffs aver they never had the opportunity to review the Marital Trust instrument in detail and 
were not aware they were the trustees of the Marital Trust until December, 2010, when Carson 
notified them of their status as trustees via emaiL The Rollins Family Office administered the 
Marital Trust and made all decisions regarding the use and distribution of the Marital Trust 
income without consulting or informing Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have testified they had trusted their father, uncle, and the "Rollins Family 
Office," i.e. LOR and then RFA, to handle their financial business and wealth management, and 
believed they were all working in the Plaintiffs' best interest. Until August 10,2010, Plaintiffs 
received only very bigh level information about the family business at family meetings. The 
Rollins Family Office would typically provide Plaintiffs signature pages of agreements or tax 
documents to sign without the full documentation. 
Currently, the LOR Class A non-voting shares are owned by Gary and Randall (17.4% 
combined), the two Marital Trusts (1'8.3% each), and the S-Trusts (or the beneficiaries of the S- 
Trust for those who have reached 45 and accepted the shares). As relates to this lawsuit, the sole 
asset of the Marital Trust is 56,507 non-voting shares of LOR. LOR's Board of Directors ("LOR 
Board") and officers since LOR's inception are as follows: 
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1986-1991 1991-2003 2003-2015 Feb. 17,2015- Mar. 23, 2016- 
M-ar 22, 2016 nresent 
Randall; Randall (Pres); Randall (pres); Randal1 (Pres); Randall (pres); 
Gary; Gary (VP); Gary (VP); Gary (VP); Gary (VP); 
Wayne (pres) Joe Young Donald Carson Donald Carson; Donald Carson; 
(Sec/Treas) Pamela Rollins; Pamela Rollins; 
Timothy Rollins; Timothy Rollins; 
Amy Rollins Amy Rollins Kreisler; 
Kreisler Paul Morton; 
Thomas Claiborne 
Gary and Randall, as LOR's controlling shareholders, may remove directors with or without 
cause at any time. 
B. LOR's Investments 
On December 16,2002, the LOR Board voted to invest LOR's stock in three different 
Rollins public companies (Rollins, Inc., RPC, Inc., and Marine Products Corporation ("MPC"» 
(the "Rollins Public Company stock") into three new investment partnerships: RFPS Investments 
I, L.P., RFPS Investments Il, L.P., and RFPS Investments III, L.P., (collectively, the "REPS 
Investments Partnerships'tj' These entities were formed on the advice of outside advisors- 
Adams Capital, Inc., Perigee Group, and King & Spalding-and there is differing testimony as to 
why this transaction took place. One explanation offered is it was part of a plan to avoid "sting 
taxes." Sting taxes are assessed on S-corporations whose passive income exceeds 25% of total 
gross receipts in any year. See I.R.C. § 1375. Ifan S-corporation incurs sting taxes for three 
consecutive years, it can lose its S-corporation status. LOR was assessed sting taxes in 1987 so 
it began investing in a series of low margin businesses with high gross receipts to avoid these 
S [n April of2003, three other management partnerships were formed: RfPS Management Company I, L.P., RFPS 
Management Company II, L.P., and RFPS Management Company III, L.P. (collectively, the 'TIPS Management 
Partnerships"). Rf A is the General Partner of each and the RFPS Investments Partnership with the corresponding 
number is the sole limited partner of each. in exchange for these limited partnership interests, each RFPS 
investments Partnership invested its Rollins Public Company stock in to the Management Partnerships. Therefore, 
Rollins Public Company distributions actually go through the RfPS Management Partnerships which retain a 
portion to pay expenses incurred by RF A with the rest going to RfPS Investment Partnerships 
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sting taxes. The formation of the RFPS Partnerships in 2002 was part of a plan (the "RFPS 
Plan") to further avoid the possibility of sting taxes. 
RFPS Investment Partnerships would have preferred and common partners. The RFPS 
Plan would pay 99% of profits to preferred partners and 1 % to common partners up to the 
Annual Preferred Target. If the Annual Preferred Target was exceeded, common partners-would 
be paid 99% and preferred partners would be paid 1 % of the amount distributed above the 
Annual Preferred Target. Thus, preferred partners would receive preferred income and cash flow 
stream from the RFPS Investment Partnerships. Glenn Grove testified this was the primary 
purpose ofthe transaction. Common partners, like LOR, would receive a disproportionate share 
of the anticipated long-term capital appreciation in the Rollins Public Company stock. Common 
partnership status would result in less passive investment income for LOR and as a result, a 
lower likelihood of incurring sting taxes, but LOR anticipated a greater long-term rate of return 
on its investments. Each of the Plaintiffs were given information about the RFPS Plan in 
November and December of2002 and were invited to invest their personal Rollins Public 
Company stock in the RFPS Investment Partnerships and become preferred partners-Nancy and 
Wayne II elected to do so while Glen and Ellen declined. All of the LOR shareholders were 
invited to participate as preferred partners except the Marital Trust and the Randall Marital Trust 
which were the two largest LOR shareholders and the only two shareholders without interest in 
other Rollins entities. The LOR Board voted for LOR to participate as a common partner. LOR 
is the largest common partner and has 74% interest in each of the RFPS Investment Partnerships. 
Plaintiffs have testified they were not provided meaningful information about the RFPS 
Investment Partnerships, the consequences of LOR becoming a common partner, and the effect 
on the distributions to the Marital Trust and Ruthie's lifetime interest. 
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LOR Investment Company ("LORlC") was formed to act as general partner of each of 
the RFPS Investment Partnerships. LOR, as LORlC's sole member, would retain control over 
the Rollins Public Company stock through LORlC. LORIC would determine distributions from 
the RFPS Investments Partnerships. David Adams testified the purpose of the transaction was to 
consolidate the Rollins Public Company stock into a control block. In December of2004, 
however, Plaintiffs signed an Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of LORIC adding 
new members and giving LOR 50% voting interest, Gary's children 25% voting interest, and 
Randall's children 25% voting interest. All Plaintiffs signed LORIC resolutions establishing a 
distribution plan for the RFPS Investment Partnerships on December 27,2004. Plaintiffs have 
testified they did not see the resolution itself, but were only given signature pages to sign. Three 
of the four Plaintiffs signed a LORIC resolution placing a ceiling on the cash distributions to 
preferred partners ofRFPS Investment Partnership I and II on March 15, 2005. However, 
Plaintiffs say they were misled by a memorandum sent by Carson on instruction from Grove 
stating the resolution's purpose was to "permit a higher distribution to their partners." They aver 
they were not informed that these entities had actually received sufficient income to distribute 
more than they did. There have been no changes to the distribution plans after these two events. 
As a result of the RFPS Investment Partnerships' distribution plans, LOR as a common partner 
receives 1 % of distributions even though it held and contributed a lion's share of the Rollins 
Public Company shares and is the 74% interest holder in the RFPS Investment Partnerships. 
Since 2004, there has al ways been sufficient income in the RFPS Investment Partnerships to 
exceed Annua1 Preferred Target, but each quarter, distributions have been held below that level. 
Plaintiffs claim the RFPS Plan has harmed LOR, causing it to incur tax liabilities that can 
exceed distributions. Also, LOR has borrowed almost $65 million from the RFPS Investment 
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Partnerships and is paying interest. RFPS Investment Partnerships are accumulating substantial 
amounts of money from capping distributions, and this money is being used to make loans to 
other entities controlled by Gary and Randall at below market rates. 
On March 23, 2016, LOR's Board added two independent directors, Thomas Claiborne 
and Paul Morton. On April 4, 2016, the LOR Board asked these two directors to consider LOR's 
participation in 2002 in the RFPS Investments Partnerships and LOR's decision in 2003, as the 
sole member of LORIC, to cause LORIC, acting as the general partner of the RFPS Investments 
Partnerships, to cause the RFPS Investments Partnerships to participate in the RFPS 
Management Partnerships. As a part of their review, Morton and Claiborne received RFPS 
Transaction documents, documents prepared by outside advisors at the time of the RFPS 
Transaction, deposition transcripts of witnesses to the RFPS Transactions, and reports prepared 
by experts for both Plaintiffs and Defendants in this litigation. On April 22, 2016, following 
their review, Claiborne and Morton voted to approve and ratify the RFPS Transactions as they 
believed they were in the best interest of LOR and its shareholders. 
C. LOR's Businesses and Other Assets 
LOR was created to invest public company dividends into private operating businesses, 
but at present, LOR's only operating businesses are Rollins Ranches, LLC and Hydradyne, LLC. 
LOR has also invested in ranch property in Florida, Texas, and Georgia for cattle and hunting 
operations conducted through Rollins Ranches. LOR leases small tracts on some of these 
properties to Gary and Randall at below market rates. These leases have not been made 
available to other LOR shareholders. Gary and Randall have built homes and improvements on 
the leased tracts for personal use and they are responsible for expenses associated with the leased 
properties. When Gary or Randall or others hunted on certain properties, they sometimes paid a 
8 
hunt fee. Although Gary and Randall paid all building and grounds expenses for a while, they 
ultimately developed a new reimbursement approach that reduced the reimbursement amounts 
and have at times written off the amount of reimbursements due to LOR. Rollins Ranches has 
operated at a loss since 1993 and is not expected to be a profitable business. LOR has loaned 
Rollins Ranches almost $75 million since 1994 and Rollins Ranches has no ability or intention to 
repay these loans. Plaintiffs believed the properties were owned by Gary and Randall, not by 
LOR until August of2010. Plaintiffs have not been allowed use of the ranch properties since 
August of2010 and have been allowed to hunt only upon invitation by Gary or Randall. 
LOR also owns a corporate Gulfstream III plane. Rollins, Inc. owned a Jetstar II and 
swapped it for its own Gulfstream III in 2003. Rollins, Inc. and LOR each pay its own aircraft 
maintenance fees, but they share the planes with each entity paying for the fuel and expenses for 
use for each flight regardless of which entity owns the plane. Until 2015, Gary and Randall were 
charged $1,000 per hour for personal use of the planes, though this rate did not cover the price of 
fue1. Randall's trips that were both personal and business were reported as business trips. Other 
LOR shareholders may use the plane only by invitation of Gary and Randall. 
Finally, LOR owns a corporate bus for business and personal use. Since the early 1990s, 
Gary and Randall have paid $1,500 per quarter for personal use, a price established by O. Wayne 
Rollins when he was LOR President. In 2003, LOR commissioned the construction of a luxury 
bus. Plaintiffs were told this was Randall's personal bus, not LOR's. 
Additionally, from 2005 to 2012, LOR has loaned $80.7 million to these other Rollins 
entities controlled by Gary and Randall and $35.5 million to Gary and Randall individually at 
below market rates. For example, LOR loaned RFT Investment Company, LLC C'RFT"), an 
entity controlled by Gary and Randall, over $25 million and RFT used the money to buy RPC, 
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Inc. stock. Now, LOR receives interest on the loan instead of receiving the earned dividends 
from the RPC stock. Although Gary and Randall have taken personal loans from LOR to 
purchase stocks, other LOR members have not been given the opportunity to borrow LOR 
money. In some instances LOR borrowed money from outside lenders at higher rates to loan the 
money to other Rollins Entities at lower rates. 
D. LOR Dividends 
Over time, LOR has reduced the percentage ofinvestrnent income paid out as dividends. 
From the mid-1980s through September of 1999, LOR Board paid 70% of its investment income 
in dividends and paid out other special dividends for taxes, family meetings, and educational 
programs. In December of 1999, LOR Board decreased its dividend payments to 35% because 
investment income had decreased significantly and to ensure proper reserves to fund operations 
and for long-term capital appreciation. LOR still made the special distributions. Plaintiffs 
contend the LOR distribution. reductions were for the purpose of ensuring the Marital Trust not 
receive a windfall or have a surplus. Ruthie's marital allowance was $20,000 a month ($240,000 
annually) before the Marital Trust was established and Gary paid this out of personal funds until 
January 1997, when he started using the Marital Trust as the source of allowance funds. In 1997 
and 1998, the Marital Trust funds exceeded her allowance. Around this same time, Ruthie had 
discontinued the payment of Gary's taxes from the Marital Trust account, as further discussed 
below. After this reduction to 35%, the distribution to the Marital Trust was $300,000 annually 
and Gary increased Ruthie's allowance to $25,000 a month. In 2003, LOR Board decided to 
convert from a fluctuating dividend based on investment income to a fixed quarterly dividend. 
LOR distributed $150,000 the first quarter of 2003 and $400,000 the remaining quarters in 2003. 
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In 2004, LOR's fixed quarterly dividend was set at $500,000 quarterly ($2 million annually) 
regardless of LOR's financial performance. 
Approximately $14 million of Marital Trust income from LOR dividends were used to 
pay Ruthie and Gary's joint tax obligations. In 1994 and 1995, approximately $5.675 million 
was transferred from the Marital Trust account at Northern Trust directly to Gary's Northern 
Trust bank account and payments to the IRS and Georgia DOR were made from Gary's account 
towards the joint tax obligations. Plaintiffs did not know about or authorize these transactions. 
From 1996 to July 1998, $1,370,000 in funds were transferred from the Northern Trust Marital 
Trust account to Ruthie's Northern Trust bank account and then to Gary's account to make 
payments towards tax obligations. In July 1998 after discovering the transfers from her account 
to Gary's, Ruthie demanded complete control over this account and told Grove that no transfers 
could be made without her consent. When such requests to transfer were made, she refused to 
consent. These transfers and tax payments were coordinated by Grove on behalf of LOR as the 
seat of the Rollins family office. 
In support of these transfers, Defendants rely on several documents prepared by George 
Strobel of Arthur Anderson in which he stated the Marital Trust income distributed to Ruthie 
would be used to pay Gary and Ruthie's joint tax obligations. Strobel testified at his deposition 
that Ruthie could consent to using her distribution from the Marital Trust to pay Gary's tax 
liabilities, but nothing in the Marital Trust instrument authorized Gary to do so. Grove avered 
King & Spalding advised him it was appropriate for LOR to make tax payments on behalf of its 
shareholders, including payment from the Marital Trust for Gary and Ruthie's joint tax 
liabilities. From 2001 to 2008, instead of LOR making distributions to the shareholders directly, 
LOR directed the pro rata distributions due to shareholders to be paid directly to the taxing 
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authorities, including $8,336,311 owed to the Marital Trust. The eight special distributions that 
were made of the Marital Trust's pro rata share were checks listing the taxpayer as "Gary W. 
Rollins." During this time frame, Ruthie had not yet elected to file ajoint return with Gary. 
The Marital Trust instrument states the Marital Trust is irrevocable, Gary has no right to 
or interest in the property of the Marital Trust, and all income must be paid to Ruthie. Grove 
states he understood that Ruthie and Plaintiffs agreed to these payments, but Ruthie avers she 
never agreed to the use of the Marital Trust income to pay taxes. The Marital Trust was required 
to make distributions to Ruthie at least on a quarterly basis. 
E. tu« Rollins Family Fractures 
At a family meeting on August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs were asked to sign certain documents 
related to a proposed perpetual management trust ("RPMT"). They refused to sign and have 
testified they began to lose faith in Gary and Randall at this meeting. On August 20, 20 I 0, 
Plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit for an accounting against Gary and Randall as the trustees of 
the Rollins Children's Trust for breaching their duties to Plaintiffs as beneficiaries of those 
trusts.f Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs stopped receiving distributions from other trusts and 
entities, and Glen was fired from his position as Orkin's CEO and President. On December 8, 
2010, Carson emailed Plaintiffs seeking direction regarding the Marital Trust. In January of 
2011, RF A discontinued financial administration and tax preparation on behalf of the Marital 
Trust. 
On August 25,2010, Ruthie filed for divorce from Gary. As a part of the divorce 
settlement agreement dated February 12, 2013, Gary offered to buy Ruth's lifetime income 
interest in the Marital Trust for $5 million and Ruth agreed to seek the approval of the Trustees 
for this transaction. On March 13, 2013, Plaintiffs asked for documents and information from 
6 LOR was later added to this separate suit as a Defendant. 
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the divorce case related to the Marital Trust and later decided they did not have enough 
information to determine if the offer was fair and did not approve of the sale by the April 1, 
2013, divorce case deadline. 
Glen, on behalf of the Marital Trust trustees, sent two informal requests for LOR 
documents on AprilS, 2013, and July 24, 2013, a formal request for inspection of records under 
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602 on October 1,2013, and a follow up request on January 7, 2014. Though 
Plaintiffs received additional documents on March 20, 2014, they were not satisfied that all the 
necessary records had been produced. 
The Trustees allege that over the course of their investigation related to Gary's $5 million 
offer, they discovered various wrongdoings by Defendants. On July 2S, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed 
their Complaint against Gary, Randall, and LOR which includes seven Counts: 1) Inspection of 
Records, 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 3) Conversion, 4) Payment of Dividends Owed, 5) Unjust 
Enrichment, 6) Dissolution, and 7) Attorneys' Fees. 
n. Standard of Review 
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine 
/ 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). A party may do this by "showing the court the documents, affidavits, 
depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a 
jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case." Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 
623-24 (2010); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 829 (1999). To avoid summary 
judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e). The Court 
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views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 
Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996). "[M]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility [are] insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (20 II); see Pafford v. Biomet, 
264 Ga. 540, 544 (l994) (finding mere speculation did not give rise to a genuine issue of 
material fact). "Hearsay, opinions, and conclusions in affidavits are inadmissible on summary 
judgment." Langley v. Nat'l Labor Grp., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 751 (2003). The party 
opposing summary judgment must show more than a "shadowy semblance of an issue." Cochran 
MiLL Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241, 242 (2007). 
III. Statute of Limitations 
Defendants argue several Counts 1 are barred by the four year statute of limitations for 
certain acts occurring before July 25,2010, while Plaintiffs argue the statute ofIimitations was 
tolled by Defendants' fraudulent concealment of Plaintiffs' status as Trustee of the Marital Trust. 
The statute oflimitations can be tolled in circumstances of actual fraud which debarred or 
deterred Plaintiffs from bringing the action. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96. "In order to establish fraudulent 
concealment under this statute sufficient to toll the statute of limitation, a plaintiff must prove 
that: (1) the defendant committed actual fraud involving moral turpitude, (2) the fraud concealed 
the cause of action from the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to 
discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the applicable statute of 
limitation." Cochran Mil! Assocs. v. Stephens, 286 Ga. App. 241,245 (2007). Ifactual fraud is 
the gravamen of the underlying complaint, no further independent fraudulent act is required to 
toll the statute, the statute is tolled until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered 
through reasonable diligence, and "[sjilence is treated as a continuation of the original actual 
7 Defendants claim Counts II and V for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment are partly barred to the extent 
they rely on conduct before July 25,20 I 0, and Counts ill and IV for conversion and payment of dividends owed are 
completely barred. 
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fraud." Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808,808 (1980). If actual fraud is not the gravamen 
of the underlying complaint, plaintiffs must show a separate independent actual fraud involving 
moral turpitude which debars or deters plaintiffs from bringing their action and "mere silence" is 
not enough to toll the statute of limitations. ld. at 809. In either case, "[a] confidential 
relationship imposes a greater duty on the parties to reveal what should be revealed and a 
lessened duty to discover independently wbat could have been discovered through the exercise of 
ordinary care. Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774 (2007); see also Smith v. Sun/Trust Bank, 325 
Ga. App. 531, 538 (2014), cert. denied (Sept. 8, 2014) ("when a confidential relationship exists, 
such as between [tbe trustee and beneficiaries of a trust], the plaintiffs duty to investigate is 
decreased, and the defendant's duty to disclose is increased. In such situations, silence when one 
should speak, or failure to discIose what ought to be disclosed, is as much a fraud in law as is an 
actual false representation. "). 
"Generally speaking, the question of whether there was fraudulent concealment justifying 
the tolling of the limitation period is a proper question for determination by a jury under proper 
instructions from the court." Sun Trust Bank, 325 Ga. App at 539 (citing Brown v. Brown, 209 
Ga. 620, 622(7) (1953». Likewise, "[w]hether a [party] exercised reasonable care in discovering 
the fraud is generally a jury question." Id. at 541 (quoting Federal Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply 
Co., 264 Ga. App. 240, 243(2), 590 S.E.2d 224 (2003». However, in certain circumstances, 
these issues can be determined as a matter of law. For instance, in Sun'Irust the Court of 
Appeals noted that a party may fail to exercise due diligence as a matter of law, particularly in 
cases where actual notice was sent of certain transactions later asserted to be concealed. Id. at 
544. Likewise, the Court of Appeal's affirmed a grant of summary judgment in a case where 
beneficiaries challenged a loan made by the trustee from the trust. See Mayfield v. Heiman, 317 
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Ga. App. 322 (2012). The beneficiaries signed documents related to the loan when the loan was 
closed and there was no evidence the trustee did anything to deter the beneficiaries from hiring 
an attorney or advisor to review documents before signing them or to deter them filing a lawsuit 
within the statute of limitations period. Id. at 328(2). Further, the Court of Appeals found no 
evidence showing the beneficiaries exercised any diligence to discover fraud. ld. 
Here, fraud has not been raised as a claim and is not the gravamen of the Complaint and 
therefore Plaintiffs must present independent evidence of actual fraud to toll the statute of 
limitations. Plaintiffs aver Gary and Randall fraudulently concealed from Plaintiffs their status 
as Trustees of the Marital Trust and Gary held himself out as the Trustee of the Marital Trust for 
his lifetime. Plaintiffs have presented evidence of actions taken on behalf of the' Rollins Family 
Office on behalf of the Marital Trust at Gary's instruction without informing or seeking the 
consent of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs testified the Rollins family was very secretive about its finances 
and they were often given signature pages to sign without the benefit of the actual document. 
However, the signature pages signed by Plaintiffs list them as "trustees," "co-trustees," or 
fiduciaries. Given this evidence, the factfinder cannot find the requisite intent to conceal from 
Plaintiffs their role as Trustee of the Marital Trust. 
Further, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence demonstrating any diligence in 
uncovering this purported fraudulent concealment. Even if Gary and Randall intended to conceal 
from Plaintiffs that they were Trustees of the Marital Trust, Plaintiffs should have been alerted to 
their role as Trustee when they were given Marital Trust documents to sign. Even if they were 
only given signature. pages, there is no evidence Plaintiffs asked for copies of the documents they 
were signing, or requested other information or clarification as to the purpose of the documents, 
Assuming, without deciding, the existence of a confidential relationship between Plaintiffs and 
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Defendants, a confidential relationship lessens Plaintiffs' duty to discover fraud, but does not 
completely eliminate their duty of diligence. See Mayfield at 326(2) (quoting Cochran Mills 
Assocs., 286 Ga. App. at 247(2)). 
Plaintiffs also contend LOR, by and through Gary and Randall as officers, directors, and 
controlling shareholders, acting as the Rollins Family Office and administrators of the Marital 
Trust, concealed certain information about the administration of the Marital Trust and the 
management of LOR Specifically, LOR pulled money from the Marital Trust to pay Gary's tax 
liabilities from 1993 until 1998. However, Ruthie, the beneficiary of the Marital Trust, made 
inquiries in 1998 about withdrawals from her Marital Trust account, demanded she be notified 
about future withdrawals, and subsequently refused requests to make distributions from her 
aCC01.mt. Plaintiffs, as Trustees of the Marital Trust, signed the Northern Trust Master Custody 
Agreement which gave them access to the Marital Trust account. Again, this evidence 
demonstrates a lack of intentional concealment by Defendants. Further, there is no evidence 
Plaintiffs acted with any diligence to discover why their permission was needed to give the 
Rollins Family Office access to the Marital Trust accounts and what type of withdrawals would 
be made from the Marital Trust account. Thus, even assuming Defendants' intentionally 
concealed their withdrawals from the Marital Trust accounts to cover Gary's tax liabilities there 
is no evidence of diligence on the part of Plaintiffs to discover the fraud. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue the breach of fiduciary claim sounds in fraud because they allege 
bad faith and fraudulent intent. Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall's self-dealing, corporate 
waste, and suppression of LOR dividends to injure the Marital Trust were independent acts of 
fraud. Plaintiffs complain about the transfer of LOR assets to the RFPS Investment Partnerships 
and the resulting depreciation of dividends to the Marital Trust. However, the undisputed 
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evidence shows the RFPS Partnership transactions were not concealed from Plaintiffs. Three of 
the four Plaintiffs signed LORIC resolutions in 2005 in their capacity as members setting a 
ceiling on cash distributions to RFPS lnvestment Partnership partners. Plaintiffs claim a memo 
given to them at the time was misleading because it stated the resolution's purpose was to 
"permit a higher distribution to their partners." They aver they were not informed that these 
entities had actually received sufficient income to distribute more than they did. However, there 
is again no evidence Plaintiffs were deterred from hiring a separate attorney or advisor to review 
the transaction or were deterred from filing a lawsuit. See Mayfield at 328. Even if, as they 
contend, they were only given signature pages to sign related to the RFPS Transactions, there is 
no evidence they undertook any level of diligence to uncover the purportedly concealed 
information. 
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of actual fraud as required to toll the 
limitations period. The extent to which the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' claims is 
discussed below as it relates to each claim. 
IV. Count 1 - Inspection of Records 
Defendants argue extensive discovery in this case has rendered the claim for inspection 
of records under O.CG.A. § 14-2-1602 moot. See Rigby v, Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop., 327 Ga. 
App. 29,37 n.7 (2014) (noting claims for inspection of corporate records appear to be moot since 
trial court ordered defendant to allow plaintiffs to inspect records and Plaintiffs "received 
voluminous corporate records regarding their accounts during discovery in this case"). The court 
may order inspection of records improperly withheld at the corporation's expense. O.C.G.A. § 
14-2-1604. However, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of any corporate records that 
were requested but not produced for inspection. Plaintiffs did not seek an order from the Court 
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requiring LOR to comply with Plaintiffs' demands on an expedited basis. O.C.G.A. § 14-2- 
1604(b). To the extent this Count seeks a judicial remedy for failure to produce or allow for 
inspection of records, the claim is moot. 
Plaintiffs argue their claim survives because Plaintiffs' pre-litigation demands for 
inspection of records were not fully met and the factfinder could award attorneys' fees under 
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-1 1 if Defendants violated this statute in bad faith. See GIR Systems, Inc. v. 
Lance, 228 Ga. App. 329, 332(7) (1997) (affirming award of attorneys' fees by trial court in 
contempt action because evidence supported finding that party acted in bad faith, been 
stubbornly litigious, and caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense by not providing 
the information ordered to be produced under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1604). However, Plaintiffs have 
a separate claim for attorneys' fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (Count VII) and have alleged no 
other damages or relief sought under this particular C01.mt. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I for inspection of records is 
GRANTED. 
IV. Count ll- Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Plaintiffs allege Defendants Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to the 
Marital Trust in a variety of ways, including: (A) entering into the RFPS Transactions which 
depressed dividends declared by LOR; (B) deliberately depressing LOR dividends declared and 
distributed; (C) failing to cause LOR to pay dividends declared and owed to the Marital Trust 
and paying Gary's tax liabilities related to the Marital Trust from the Marital Trust distributions; 
and (D) purchasing and maintaining ranches, R V s, and aircraft on behalf of LOR that were 
ultimately used for personal use. Each of the alleged breaches is discussed in turn. 
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A. RFPS Transactions 
Count II for breach of fiduciary duty includes allegations related to the RFPS 
Transactions. In December of2002, LOR contributed its Rollins Public Company stock to the 
RFPS Investment Partnerships and the stock was ultimately contributed to RFPS Management 
Partnerships in 2003 (the "RFPS Transactions"). The current distribution policies for the RFPS 
Investment Partnerships were set by non-party LORIC, the general partner, in 2005 or earlier. 
Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it 
relates to the RFPS Transactions is GRANTED as barred by the statute of limitations as 
discussed above in Section III. However, to provide a complete record, the Court will consider 
Defendants' other bases for dismissal. 
1. Approval by Claiborne and Morton 
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim based on Gary and Randall's 
conflicting interest as both LOR directors and shareholders and the self-dealing nature of the 
RFPS Transactions must be dismissed because two independent directors appointed in 2016 
retroactively approved the conflicted interest transaction pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-861 &- 
862. These statutes provide a safe harbor for conflicted director transactions if at least two 
qualified directors affirm the transaction after required disclosures. See O.C.O.A. § 14-2-862(a). 
Plaintiffs ·first argue the safe harbor provision does not apply because the RFPS 
Transactions were not "director's conflicting interest transactions" under O.C.O.A. § 14-2-860(2) 
under which a transaction must be effected by a director in which he has a conflicted interest. 
Gary and Randall, as two of three directors of the LOR Board voted to invest LOR's stock in the 
RFPS Investment Partnerships, and therefore effected the transaction as directors. At the time of 
the transactions, the common partners ofRFPS Investment Partnerships included Grace Rollins 
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(mother), several of Gary and Randall's children, trusts to which Randall and Gary were trustees, 
and entities for which Randall and Gary also serve as directors and officers, such as RHC. A 
transaction can be conflicted if "[the director] or a related person is a party to the transaction or 
has a beneficial interest in or so closely linked to the transaction and of such financial 
significance to the director or a related person that it would reasonably be expected to exert an 
influence on the director's judgment." See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-60(1 )(A) (emphasis added). Gary 
and Randall's mother, children, trusts, and entities who all participated in the RFPS Transactions 
as preferred partners meet the definition of related person under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860(a)(3). 
Therefore, the Court 'finds the RFPS Transactions qualify as director conflicting interest 
transactions and the safe harbor provision is applicable if the conditions are met. 
Plaintiffs next argue the ex post facto approval of the RFPS Transactions by the new 
directors should not be allowed because it subverts the role of the judiciary. The directors 
approved and ratified the transactions on April 22, 2016, a few days before the filing of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and more than a decade after the RFPS Transactions took place. 
However, the plain Language of the statute makes clear that independent director approval may 
take place at any time-before or after the transaction. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-861(b)(1) (a 
conflicted director's action cannot be set aside on the grounds of conflicting interest if the ... 
Directors' action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in compliance with Code 
Section 14-2-862"); see also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-862, Comments (" Action complying with 
subsection 14-2-862(a) may be taken by the board of directors at any time-before or after the 
transaction."). Had the legislature intended for the approval to occur within a reasonable time 
following the transaction they couId have so legislated. 
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Finally, having determined that the transactions were conflicting, the Court next 
considers whether Claiborne and Morton were qualified directors, received the required 
disclosures from Gary and Randall, and conducted a diligent review of the transactions. See 
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-862(a). Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne are not "qualified" because they 
receive a salary from LOR and can be removed by the majority shareholders of LOR, i.e., Gary 
and Randall. A "qualified director" is "any director who does not have either (1) a conflicting 
interest respecting the transaction or (2) a familial, financial, professional, or employment 
relationship with a second director who does have a conflicting interest respecting the 
transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be expected to exert an 
influence on the first director's judgment when voting on the transaction." O.C.G.A. § 14-2- 
862( d). The statute, however, cannot be read to prohibit a relationship between an otherwise 
qualified director and the business corporation itself. Presumably, most ifnot all paid directors 
will be viewed to have a professional and financial relationship with the corporation. The statute 
does not prohibit these relationships, but rather prohibits a separate relationship with the 
conflicted director. Here, there is no evidence of a "familial, financial, professional, or 
employment relationship" between Morton and Claiborne on one hand and Gary and Randall on 
the other. Thus, the Court finds Morton and Claiborne are "qualified" as required by O.C.G.A. § 
14-2-862( d). 
Next, Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne did not receive complete required disclosure 
from Gary and Randall. '''Required disclosure' means disclosure by the director who has a 
conflicting interest of (A) the existence and nature of his conflicting interest, and (B) all facts 
known to him respecting the subject matter of the transaction that an ordinarily prudent person 
would reasonably believe to be material to a judgment as to whether or not to proceed with the 
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transaction." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-860(4). The evidence shows Morton and Claiborne were 
provided documents created by outside advisors, Adams Capital, Inc. and Perigee Group, at the 
time of the RFPS Transactions. They were also given access to documents created in the course 
of tills litigation, including expert reports from Plaintiffs and Defendants, pleadings, discovery 
responses, and Plaintiffs' depositions. They interviewed Grove, Randall, and Gary as well as 
several officers. They were advised by independent counsel. These documents disclose the 
existence and nature of the conflict as asserted by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not presented 
evidence of a withheld fact which an ordinary prudent person would believe to be material in 
reviewing the RFPS Transactions.8 Thus, the Court finds the disclosure met the requirements of 
the safe harbor statute. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue Morton and Claiborne's conclusion that Gary and Randall acted 
in the best interest of LOR and its shareholders should be disregarded because they did not 
review the RFPS Transactions with the requisite diligence. Directors must act "[i]n a manner he 
believes in good faith to be in the best interest of the corporation." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a)(I); 
Enchanted Valley RV Resort, Ltd. v. Weese, 241 Ga. App. 415, 423 (1999) ("A corporate officer 
or director owes to the corporation and its stockholders a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty, which 
requires that they act in utmost good faith."). A director's decision is only protected by the 
business judgment rule when it is "reasonably informed by due diligence." FDIC v. Loudermilk, 
295 Ga. 579, 581, 584 (2014). Georgia common law gives directors wide latitude to manage the 
affairs of the corporation so long as they are not acting "blindly, recklessly, or heedlessly" or 
~ Plaintiffs combine their arguments about requisite disclosure and due diligence, but the safe harbor statute sets out 
disclosures, not diligence, requirements. Evidence that Morton did not remember or understand certain 
ramifications of the RFPS Transactions to individual shareholders is not evidence Gary and Randall did not make 
requisite disclosures. Whether Gary and Randall made proper disclosures about the RFPS Transaction as required 
under the safe harbor provision is a separate inquiry from whether or not Morton and Claiborne's review of the 
disclosures was sufficiently diligent to sufficiently inform their conclusion that the transactions were in the best 
interests of LOR. 
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acting "as mere dummies or figureheads." Id. at 580-81. In other words, the courts distinguish 
between how the decision was made (the process was one of "unthinking acquiescence") and the 
ultimate merit or wisdom of the business decision. Id. at 582. The directors must act with the 
care of an "ordinarily prudent person in a like position" and is entitled to rely on opinions of 
reliable and competent officers and employees of the corporation, legal counsel, accountants, or 
other professionals. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b)(1) & (2). 
As evidence oflack of diligence, Plaintiffs argue Morton was unable to answer questions 
about the RFPS Transactions at his July 18 deposition, approximately three months after 
ratifying the RFPS Transactions. Plaintiffs also argue the review occurred in less than a month 
which was insufficient time to review the complex transaction. Defendants respond a memory 
test should not be the applicable test for due diligence. The Court finds Plaintiffs have not 
presented evidence the process used by Morton and Claiborne to review the transaction was not 
sufficiently diligent. Given the review took place after the RFPS Transactions occurred, Morton 
and Claiborne actually had access to more information than was available at the time of the 
RFPS Transactions. The Court is not persuaded that failing to remember certain aspects of a 
complex transaction indicates the process was faulty. Therefore, Defendants may avail 
themselves of the safe harbor provision and the business judgment rule applies to the actions of 
Gary and Randall.9 
9 The Court finds the safe harbor provision removes the conflict of interest from the analysis but does not remove 
Gary and Randall's duty to comply with the business judgment rule or completely immunize them from a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs argue conflicted controlling shareholders like Gary and Randall cannot take 
advantage of the safe harbor provision. However, the challenged decisions were made by the LOR Board, not by 
shareholders. The Court does not agree that a conflicted director can lose safe harbor protections by having a dual 
role as director and controlling shareholder. 
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2. The Business Judgment Rule 
Having established the business judgment rule applies to Gary and Randall's decision to 
undertake the RFPS Transactions, we look to whether the transaction was conducted in bad faith 
to the minority shareholders. Plaintiffs have presented evidence from which the factfinder might 
conclude the RFPS Transactions were undertaken in bad faith or to intentionally harm minority 
shareholders' interest in LOR. The ultimate structure provided large short-term gain to all the 
original LOR shareholders except the two Marital Trusts and provided long-term capital 
appreciation to the Marital Trust, a benefit of little value a shareholder with only a lifetime 
income interest. There is evidence that supports Plaintiffs contention the RFPS Transactions 
were structures in a way to limit cash flow to LOR for the purpose of depriving the Marital Trust 
of cash. Likewise, Defendants have presented evidence from which the factfinder might 
conclude the RFPS Transactions were undertaken in good faith for legitimate business purposes, 
such as avoiding sting taxes or maintaining asset control, and were fair to the minority 
shareholders. Defendants present evidence they relied on the advice of a trove of outside 
advisors to devise this wealth management scheme and the long term capital appreciation 
realized and tax benefits gained through these transactions was in the best interest of LOR and all 
its shareholders. The factfinder could, after considering the evidence, determine the directors 
acted in bad faith, and the application of the business judgment rule is not independent grounds 
for dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS Transactions. 
3. RFPS Distribution Decisions 
Defendants argue Plaintiffs are estopped from complaining about distributions from the 
RFPS Investment Partnerships because they approved of the distribution policies as members of 
LORIC. "[S]hareholders in a corporation who participate in the performance of an act or who 
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acquiesce and ratify the same are estopped even in equity to complain thereof." Medlin v. 
Carpenter, 174 Ga. App. 50, 52 (1985) (finding former employee and minority shareholder was 
estopped from bringing a claim for a bonus and a dividend based on majority shareholder and 
president's receipt of a bonus based on percentage of profits because former employee approved 
the disputed bonus in his capacity as a director); see also Clayton v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 
237 Ga. 604, 604 (1976) (finding wife who served as co-trustee and co-executor of husband's 
will was estopped from complaining about changes to trust property to which she agreed in 
writing). 
In December of 2004, Plaintiffs each signed documents establishing distribution policies 
for each of the RFPS Investment Partnerships setting distribution amounts below the Annual 
Preferred Target. In March, 2005, three of the four Plaintiffs signed a LORIe resolution on 
behalf of themselves which raised the quarterly distributions for two of the three RFPS 
Investment Partnerships while still maintaining distribution amount below the Annual Preferred 
Target. The distribution policies for the RFPS Investment Partnerships have not been changed 
since that time. Plaintiffs claim they were only given signature pages and did not understand 
what they were signing. However, "the only type of fraud that can relieve a party of his 
obligation to read a written contract and be bound by its terms is a fraud that prevents the party 
from reading the contract." Legacy Acad., Inc. v. Mamilove, LLC, 297 Ga. 15, 17 (2015). There 
is no evidence Plaintiffs were prohibited from asking for full copies of the documents they were 
asked to sign or to ask questions regarding those contracts, or even employ outside advisors. 
Instead, they only claim to have been misled by a memo from Grove stating the resolution would 
"permit a higher distribution to their partners" even though that statement is true. Plaintiffs 
argue the memo was misleading because it failed to mention there would be more income 
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coming into the RFPS Investment Partnerships than would be distributed. Whether Plaintiffs 
fully understood the distribution policies ofRFPS Investment Partnerships, they signed LORIC 
documents ratifying the policy and cannot now rely on their failure to fully comprehend the 
consequences of the policy to challenge that same policy. Therefore, the estoppel argument 
raised by Defendants is independent grounds for dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
as it relates to the distribution policies ofRFPS Investment Partnerships. 
4. Equitable Relief 
Defendants' argue equitable relief sought against RFPS Investment Partnerships cannot 
be sought because they are non-parties. Plaintiffs respond they have contemplated several 
appropriate remedies, such as forcing Defendants to liquidate the RFPS Investment Partnerships, 
ordering RFPS Investment Partnerships to make distributions above the Annual Preferred Target, 
and to distribute money sitting in RFPS Investment Partnerships' accounts to LOR and then 
order LOR to distribute Marital Trust's share to it. The Court finds no legal basis for granting 
equitable relief against non-parties, including RFPS Investment Partnerships, RFPS Management 
Partnerships, LORIC as General Partner of the RFPS Investment Partnerships, and LORIC's 
non-party members, including Randall's children who hold 25% voting interest. As such, any 
claim for equitable relief as a result of a breach of fiduciary duty related to the RFPS 
Transactions is dismissed as a matter oflaw. See Barham v. City a/Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375, 379 
(2013) ("Trial courts 'may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make 
punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been 
adjudged according to law. ''') (quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 324 
U.S. 9, 13 (1945)). 
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In sum, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' 
breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS Transactions as barred by application of 
the statute of limitations as discussed above in Section III In the absence of a statute of 
limitations argument, Defendants' Motion would be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claim for 
breach offiduciary duty claim as it relates to the RFPS distribution policies and Plaintiffs' 
request for equitable relief. Otherwise, the Motion would be DENIED. 
B. LOR Dividend Policies 
Count IT for breach of fiduciary duty includes allegations related to certain LOR dividend 
policies. In 2003, LOR Board decided to convert from a fluctuating dividend based on 
investment income to a fixed quarterly dividend. In 2004, LOR's current fixed quarterly 
dividend was set at $500,000 quarterly ($2 million annually) regardless of LOR's financial 
performance. The Court of Appeals in a related case determined there were no fact questions to 
support a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Gary and Randall arising from the reduction of 
pro rata dividends paid from LOR compared with prior years. [0 The Court of Appeals noted 
Gary and Randall were authorized under the LOR Articles of Incorporation to set dividends and 
concluded "to the extent that the Plaintiffs are claiming that Gary and Randall have reduced the 
pro rata dividends paid through LOR and RHC compared with prior years, or have retained 
earnings, we find no breach of fiduciary duty and no fact questions because Gary and Randall 
had authority through the corporate bylaws to make those decisions." Rollins v. Rollins, 338 Ga. 
App. 308,323(3) (2016), reconsideration denied (July 27,2016), cert petition denied (April 17, 
2017). This Court finds this precludes a claim brought by Plaintiffs in this case on behalf of the 
Marital Trust, another minority interest holder in LOR. Therefore, the Motion for Summary 
10 In this related case, Plaintiffs, in their capacity as beneficiaries of certain Trusts that held minority interest in 
LOR, sued Defendants Gary and Randall, in their capacity as trustees of the Trusts and as directors of LOR. 
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Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it relates to LOR's dividend policies is 
GRANTED. 11 
C. Diverting Marital Trust Dividends to Pay Gary's Tax Liability 
Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust 
when they caused LOR to withdraw money from the Marital Trust account to satisfy Gary 
Rollins's tax liabilities. The last withdrawal from the Marital Trust account without Ruth's 
approval was in 1998. Plaintiffs' also claim Gary and Randall breached their fiduciary duties to 
the Marital Trust when they caused LOR distributed money owed to the Marital Trust from LOR 
directly to the taxing authorities. These distributions were made between 2001 and 2008 and 
therefore the claim is time-barred as discussed in Section III above. Therefore, the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Count II for breach of fiduciary duty as it relates to LOR's dividend 
payments is GRANTED as barred by the statute of limitations. However, to provide a complete 
record, the Court win consider Defendants' other bases for dismissal. 
Defendants argue any claims related to the use of Marital Trust funds to pay Gary's tax 
liabilities are barred because Plaintiffs authorized LOR to administer the Marital Trust and LOR 
directed the transfer of funds to pay Ruthie and Gary's joint tax liability pursuant to that 
authority. In response, Plaintiffs argue neither they nor Ruthie authorized LOR to violate the 
Marital Trust instrument by sending funds to Gary's account and to tax authorities. The Marital 
Trust instrument expressly stated it was a grantor trust, Gary retained no "right, title, or interest 
in or power, privilege, or incident of ownership" in the Marital Trust assets, and Ruthie would 
receive "all of the trust income, in quarterly or more frequent installments, until her death." The 
intent of LOR's outside advisors to pay Gary's grantor tax liabilities using Marital Trust funds is 
II Defendants also argue Plaintiffs are seeking impermissible speculative damages. The Court believes the expert 
opinions presented in evidence by Plaintiffs would create a fact question and would not be a basis for dismissal of 
the breach of fiduciary duty claim as it relates to the LOR distribution policies. 
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unavailing in the face of the clear and unambiguous trust instrument. At best, there is a dispute 
of material fact whether Ruthie agreed to this tax payment plan or not. It is clear she expressly 
disapproved of the tax payment plan in July of 1998 when she asked that no more money be 
withdrawn from the Northern Trust Marital Trust account without her permission and later 
rejected requests to make payments from that account. 
Defendants further argue Ruthie benefitted from the use of the Marital Trust funds 
because they were used to pay the joint tax liability and therefore, she would be unjustly 
enriched if she were to receive the amount of trust funds used to reduce the tax liability she was 
jointly and several1y owed. Plaintiffs respond the $14 million taken from the Marital Trust was 
separate property belonging to Ruthie and was tax-free for her under the express terms of the 
Trust Instrument. The funds were taken each year before Ruthie elected to file a joint return with 
her husband and therefore when the money was taken, there was no joint obligation to pay taxes. 
Further, Plaintiffs note in 1994 Ruthie only claimed $61,671 in taxable income out of more than 
$22 million total income. Therefore her share of tax liability wouLd be far less than the 
$5,675,000 taken from the Marital Trust that year to pay tax liabilities, and thus Ruthie did not 
assent to or benefit from the use of Marital Trust funds to pay her comparatively insignificant tax 
liabili ties. 
Finally, Defendants argue that while Ruthie as beneficiary did not have authority to 
release claims held by the Marital Trust, Ruthie would be prohibited from accepting any 
proceeds from the claim under the terms of her settlement agreement from Ruthie and Gary's 
divorce. Any Marital Trust funds that were wrongfully taken from the Trust would have been 
paid out to Ruthie as the beneficiary under the terms of the Marital Trust instrument. This 
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circuity of action argument was previously raised in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and rejected 
by the Court and is not now differently persuaded. 
As such, in the absence of a statute of limitations bar, Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Claims II as it relates to the use of Marital Trust dividends to pay taxes would be 
DENIED. 
D. Corporate Waste: Ranches, Planes, Bus, and Loans 
Plaintiffs allege Gary and Randall committed corporate waste related to certain assets 
acquired and maintained by LOR and used by Gary and Randall for personal use, including 
ranch and hunting properties, planes and a bus. The Court must ask two separate questions: (1) 
was there a rational business purpose for LOR to purchase the assets and (2) was the company 
fairly compensated for the director's personal use of LOR's assets. 
As to the first question, the parties have both submitted evidence in support of their 
opposing positions as to whether Defendants' decisions to purchase and maintain these particular 
LOR assets were made in good fai th to be in the best interests of the corporation after exercising 
the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a); FDICv. 
Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579,581,580-81 (2014). The factfinder can determine whether Gary and 
Randall made these asset decisions in bad faith for the purpose of benefitting themselves or for 
legitimate business purposes. 
However, the Court agrees the injury suffered by LOR and all its other shareholders for 
purchasing and maintaining these assets is no different than the injury suffered by the Marital 
Trust. This claim is unlike the claims alleging the Marital Trust suffered a special injury. Thus, 
the breach of fiduciary claim as it relates to the purchase and maintenance of the ranches, the bus 
and the planes cannot be maintained as a direct action. See Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 
31 
264 Ga. 817, 820 (1994) (finding one claim could be maintained as direct action but other claims 
were "founded upon injuries which are no different from that suffered by the corporation or the 
other shareholders" and therefore "cannot be sustained because they are, in the final analysis, 
derivative claims."), 
As to the second question, whether Gary and Randall's exclusive and personal use of 
these LOR assets was a breach of their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust, Plaintiffs argue the 
entire fairness standard applies, not the business judgment rule, because benefits from LOR to 
Gary and Randall, as directors and controlling shareholders in LOR, would be self-dealing 
transactions. This Court agrees. Both sides present evidence demonstrating a dispute of material 
fact as to whether the personal use and any reimbursements made for personal use were fair. 
Thus, this is a disputed issue for the factfinder to resolve. Furthermore, since personal use of the 
assets was only available to some shareholders and not to others, the Court finds a direct action 
in this circumstance is available. 
As part of this claim of self-dealing, Plaintiffs claim Gary and Randall caused LOR to 
enter ninety-nine year leases for property at the ranches for their personal use at terms that were 
unduly favorable to Gary and Randall. These leases were executed in January, 1993, before the 
Marital Trust was formed and became a shareholder of LOR. However, Plaintiffs respond the 
leases were secretly entered into and Defendants continued them despite knowing that they 
harmed other shareholders. However, the leases could not have been a secret from the Marital 
Trust which had not been created at the time the leases were executed. Plaintiffs claim the 
Marital Trust has standing based on continuous payments below market on the leases and 
inadequate rent, not the initial execution of the Lease. The Court finds any breach offiduciary 
duty occurred at the execution of the lease, not upon the subsequent rent payments required 
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under the terms of the lease. Since any harm to shareholders would have occurred in 1993, any 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the leases would be barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Finally, Plaintiffs allege Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Marital Trust 
by making twelve below-market loans from LOR to Gary and Randall and to other entities 
controlled by Gary and Randall from 2005 to 2012, that resulted in losses for LOR and its 
shareholders. 
For all loans occurring before July 25,2010, this claim is barred by the four year statute of 
limitations. For the remaining four loans made after this date (a 2012 loan to RALTF, LP and 
three loans made to RIF on July 19, 2010, August 26, 2010, and May 19, 2011) there remains a 
question of fact whether the terms of the loan were fair. The Court has also considered 
Defendants' position that this claim must be brought as a derivative claim. However, the Court 
finds a direct action is justified in these circumstances for the reasons set out in the Court's prior 
Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim on the same basis. 
V. COUNT III - CONVERSION/ Money Had and Received Against Gary Rollins 
Plaintiffs' claim for conversion alleges Gary Rollins wrongfully took money from the 
Marital Trust bank accounts on January 17, 1995 and on March 31, 1995. The statute of 
limitations for a conversion claim is four years. Walden v. Jones, 252 Ga. App. 692, 694 (2001). 
Because this claim accrued on or before July 25,2010, it is barred by the statute oflimitations 
for the reasons discussed above. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count TIr for 
conversion is GRANTED. 
Assuming the statute of limitations was tolled, Defendants argue this claim should be 
dismissed because LOR was authorized to administer the Trust and LOR directed the money to 
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pay Gary and Ruth's joint tax liabilities. However, Plaintiffs dispute they approved LOR to 
administer the Marital Trust contrary to the Marital Trust instrument. Under the instrument, 
Gary as grantor maintained the tax liabilities, but had no rights over the Trust property. Thus, in 
the absence of a statute of limitations defense, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence for 
presentation to the finder of fact. 
VI. COUNT IV - PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS DECLARED AND OWED AGAINST 
LOR 
Plaintiffs' claim for payment of dividends alleges LOR declared and owed dividends to 
the Marital Trust that were not paid. All of these dividends were declared between 2001 and 
2008. Plaintiffs concede this claim would be barred in the absence of a tolling of the statute of 
limitations and, as discussed above, there is no evidence of fraud sufficient to toll the statuteof 
limitations. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count IV for payment of 
dividends owed is GRANTED. 
[n the absence of a statute of limitation defense, the Court finds there would be a 
sufficient issue of material fact for the tinder of fact on this Count. 
VII. Count V - Unjust Enrichment Against Gary Rollins 
Plaintiffs claim Gary was unjustly enriched when he took money from the Marital Trust 
bank accounts and when LOR diverted dividends intended for the Marital Trust to Gary's 
personal accounts. The statute of limitations for an unjust enrichment claim is four years and 
begins to run on the date the claim could be brought. Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 
301 Ga. App. 254, 258(2) (2009). As discussed above, these allegations are time-barred. 
To the extent Plaintiffs are alleging Gary was unjustly enriched through his self-dealing 
and his personal use of LOR assets, these claims would not be barred to the extent they occurred 
after July 25,2010. 
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Thus, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count V for unjust enrichment is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
VIII. Count VI - Dissolution of LOR 
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claim for dissolution fails because they are unable to present 
evidence of corporate waste and there are adequate remedies at law precluding equitable relief. 
See Gregory v. JT Gregory & Son, inc., 176 Ga. App. 788, 791 (1985); Smith v. Albright- 
England, Co., 171 Ga. 544,545 (1930). Plaintiffs argue there is sufficient evidence of corporate 
waste and the general principal against equitable relief if there are adequate remedies oflaw does 
not apply in the face of a statutory right for dissolution under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1430(2)(D). This 
statute allows for judicial dissolution in proceeding by shareholder if "corporate assets are being 
misapplied or wasted." Id. Since the claim for corporate waste survives the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, so would the claim for dissolution. 
Defendants argue the claim for dissolution must be brought as a derivative claim. 
Plaintiffs rely on O.C.G.A. §14-2-1430 which expressly allows a claim for dissolution to be 
brought "by a shareholder" against a corporation. This Court agrees the claim for dissolution can 
be maintained as a direct action. 
Finally, Defendants raise the defense oflaches. "[Cjourts of equity may interpose an 
equitable bar whenever, from the lapse oftirne and laches of the complainant, it would be 
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-3. This defense requires 
proof of (1) unreasonable delay and (2) prejudice to Defendants. Stone v. Williams, 265 Ga. 480 
(1995). "[L] aches is a factual defense." Troup v. Loden, 266 Ga. 650, 650 (1996). Relying on 
the same arguments raised for tolling the statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claim they did not 
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discover their role as trustees of the Marital Trust or Gary and Randall's wrongdoing until 
recently. Further, they claim Defendants were not prejudiced by the delay in bringing the suit. 
Plaintiff's claim for dissolution is based on alleged corporate waste and the alleged corporate 
waste, as discussed above, has occurred within the statute oflimitations. Therefore, Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Count VI for dissolution is DENIED. 
IX. Equitable Remedies and Damages Sought 
A. Constructive Trust 
Plaintiffs seek a constructive trust against Gary and Randall as an alternative to damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty exceeding $100 million and as an alternative to the approximately 
$14 million of restitution sought in Count V for unjust enrichment. "A constructive trust is a 
trust implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property, 
either from fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without 
violating some established principle of equity." O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132(a) (eff. July 1, 2010). To 
the extent the claims survive the Motion, Defendants argue there are adequate remedies at law 
precluding equitable relief. The Court will reserve a ruling until after any appeal is finally 
resolved. 
Defendants also argue the remedy is inappropriate since the RFPS Partnerships that hold 
the Rollins Public Company stock are not a party. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-132(a); Kelly, 258 Ga. 660 
(1988). However, the claims related to the RFPS Transactions are time-barred so this argument 
is moot. 
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B. Attorneys' Fees 
A claim for attorneys' fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6- II is not an independent cause of 
action. As there are other claims surviving summary judgment, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to attorneys' fees is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2017. 
~e;:·K.~~ 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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